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Regulating Risk-Taking by Mutual Funds
Mutual funds' are subject to stricter controls on the use of two im-
portant investment techniques-leveraging 2  and short selling3-than
most other investors.4 In establishing the controls, Congress and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) evidently intended to place
limits on the degree of risk5 to which mutual funds could subject them-
selves. The controls, however, are misconceived. They do not, in fact,
place a ceiling on risk-taking. Rather, they serve simply to cripple the
1. Mutual funds, like investment companies in general, arc corporations that manage
the investments of their shareholders by buying and selling securities. Unlike some other
investment companies, their shares are not traded in any securities market but may
be redeemed by the investor at any time for the value at the time of redemption. Be-
cause their shares may be redeemed, they are referred to as open.end management
companies. They are at present the largest segment of the investment company industry.
See SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONs OF INvESrtMENT COMPANY GROtnl, H.R. REP. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-47 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Co-.,4Nvt" Gnovni RE% ].
2. An investment is "leveraged" when it is purchased with borrowed funds; securities
are commonly used as collateral.
3. A "short sale" is an investment technique used to profit from a decline in a
security's price. Stock is borrowed from a broker and an obligation is incurred to return
it within a specified amount of time. The stock is sold immediately, and repurchased
within the specified period. The short sale is closed when the stock is returned. A profit
is made if the price of the borrowed stock declines between the sale and repurchase. The
short seller must pay any dividends that the stock pays while the short sale is open.
See P. SAMUELSON, EcoxoMics 401 (8th ed. 1970); D. HEMsm & J. Tonix, Rtm Avrnszox
AND PoRTFoLIo CHoicE 41-42 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HasMa & Tont.'l.
4. Certain institutional investors other than mutual funds are subject to such con-
trols. For instance, insurance companies, pension trusts, and trusteed portfolios are
limited in the riskiness of the securities they may acquire. The policy behind these
regulations is that these institutions should provide a guaranteed low risk and retui
rather than provide access to high risk/high return investments. See Note. The Regu-
lation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REv. 603-16 (1970); note 5 infra. Presumably.
these same rules on degree of risk would be interpreted to prevent such institutions front
leveraging and short selling. However, mutual funds differ in that their purpose is to
give the small investor who desires to take risks effective access to the high risk/high
return investments of the securities markets, provided that the level of risk a fund
proposes to take is revealed to investors. The law does not prevent funds from purchasing
high risk securities, but does restrict their use of leverage and short selling. See p. 1312
infra.
5. The term "risk" refers to variance in the return on a given investment. It is the
dispersion of less likely outcomes around a most likely outcome. An invesunent is deemed
riskless if a given level of return is guaranteed; an investment becomes increasingly risky
as the chances increase that the return will differ from the expected value. See J.
WVILLIAMSON, INvEsTmhNTS: NEW ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 26-32 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as J. WiLLIAmsoN, TECHNIQUES]; Joyce & Vogel, The Uncertainty in Risch: Is 'arianceUnambiguous?, 25 J. FINANCE 127, 127.28, 131 (1970).
Leverage will increase risk by increasing the volatility of an investment's return. For
example, an investor with net assets of 100 invested in securities will lose ten in a ten
percent price decline and gain ten in a ten percent price rise. If he borrows rift) he
will increase both his loss and gain to fifteen, minus, of course, interest costs. See J.
WILLIAMSON, TECHNIQUES 106-08; Sharpe, A Simpl'fied Model for Portfolio Analysis,9 MA.NAGEMEN'r SCIENE 27/7 (1963).
Some minor qualifications to the definition of risk can be found in W. SImRPE, PoRT-
FOLIO THEORY AND CAPrrAL AfARETs 25-26 (1970); D. FARRAit, Tim INvEsTMENTr DEcISIoN
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 2 (1965).
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funds' performance6 capabilities, forcing them to take larger risks than
would otherwise be necessary to achieve a given return. The special
controls should therefore be withdrawn, and mutual funds given access
to leverage and short selling on a par with other investors.
I. Unequal Access to Leverage and Short Selling
The securities acts contain a double layer of provisions controlling
access to leverage and short selling. First, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 19347 contains provisions affecting all investors. The Investment
Company Act of 19408 then sets forth further restrictions applicable
only to mutual funds. The Company Act controls, in turn, are supple-
mented by provisions in the Internal Revenue Code.0 The result is that
mutual funds are more restricted than other investors in the use of
leverage and short selling.10
A. Leverage
1. TheExchangeAct
The Exchange Act" gives the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) author-
ity to promulgate regulations controlling the maximum amount of
credit that lenders may extend for the purpose of buying or carrying
securities. The FRB has varied the maximum according to its assess-
ment of economic conditions, generally raising the maximum to en-
courage economic expansion and lowering it to achieve the contrary.' 2
6. The term "performance" refers to risk-adjusted return. Normally an investor can
achieve higher returns by taking higher risks. Therefore, one investor can accurately
be said to outperform another only if he achieves higher returns for the same risk level.
See SEC, 2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 325-28 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL STUDY].
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Exchange Act].
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Company Act].
9. See p. 1310 infra.
10. Leverage and short selling have economic equivalents in, respectively, calls (op.
tions to buy stock) and puts (options to sell stock). To the extent that mutual funds
are able to use puts and calls, they can in effect circumvent any limitations on leverage
and short selling. Although the SEC has promulgated no express limitations on the
acquisition of puts and calls, it appears from an examination of prospectuses and from
statements by SEC officials that a ten percent of net assets limitation has been enforced
by the SEC in approving prospectuses of mutual funds. Telephone Interview with staff
of the SEC, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1973. The individual officials interviewed
requested that their names be kept confidential. A record of the interview is on file
with the Yale Law Journal. See, e.g., Prospectus of the Heritage Fund, Inc., April 16,
1971, at 8.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 7 8(g) (1970).
12. The rate set by the FRB is stated in terms of margin, that is, the percentage
of the value of a security that an investor must deposit in order to buy it. The per.
centage of a security's value which can be borrowed can be obtained by subtracting
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The FRB regulations, however, contain a number of loopholes
which make the effective maximum level of credit an investor may
obtain much higher than the nominal maximum set by the FRB.a3
First, since the credit controls on domestic lenders other than brokers,
and on all foreign lenders, apply only to loans using securities as col-
lateral, these lenders may make unsecured loans in unlimited amounts
even if the borrower's purpose is to purchase securities.1 4
Second, even if a loan does use securities as collateral, limits on credit
advanced by lenders other than brokers apply only if the purpose of
the loan is to purchase or carry securities, and the term "purpose" has
been interpreted broadly enough so that, in certain situations, borrow-
ing by individuals can clearly exceed the nominal limits.25
Third, the FRB has exercised its authority only over the initial pur-
chase of securities, not over the carrying of securities.10 Therefore, if
securities are purchased with the maximum amount of credit allowed
by FRB rules, and their value declines so that the amount of tie loan
surpasses that permitted by law, no additional payment will be re-
quired.'7
the margin rate from 100. Thus, if the current margin rate is sixty., an investor may
borrow no more than forty percent of the purchase price of a security. A table listing
the various rates in force from 1934 to July 28, 1960, can be found in the EcYCI.oPEItA
oF BANKING AND FINANCE 431 (1961). Data for July 28, 1960, to present can be found
in FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8c (1960-72); 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. RE!'. C 22,236 (1973).
13. In the years before 1973, the loopholes were even more numerous. The FRB
has only gradually extended the coverage of its regulations over the full range of pos-
sible lenders, leaving the others open as sources of unregulated credit. Brokers, dealers,
and members of registered securities exchanges were covered by Regulation T in 1934.
See Solomon & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20
J. PUB. LAW 167, 171-72 (1971). Banks making loans for the purchase or carrying of
securities were covered by Regulation U in 1936. See id. at 171.72. FRB Reg. U prs-
ently is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1972). Other lenders were covered by Regulation
G in 1968. See Solomon & Hart, supra, at 183-84. FRB Reg. G presently is codified at
12 C.F.R. § 207 (1972). Finally, foreign lenders were covered by Regulation X in 1971.
See Solomon & Hart, supra, at 202-11. FRB Reg. X presently is codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 224 (1972).
Also, the FRB has permitted different lenders to make loans on different classes of
securities. For instance, those lenders covered by Regulation T were, until 1963, per-
mitted to make loans only on securities listed on a registered securities exchange. As
of 1969, they were permitted to make loans on certain designated nonlisted securities.
Solomon & Hart, supra, at 168. Other lenders, including banks, while presently able
to make loans on over-the-counter (OTC) stock only to the extent permitted lenders
covered by Regulation T, were able before 1969 to nake unrestricted loans on OTC
stock. The pre-1969 rules are summarized in 4 SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF TIE SEcurtmEs
MAPKrs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-35 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STUDY]; the post-1969 rules are contained in FRB Reg. G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f)
(1972), and FRB Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a)(1) (1972).
14. See Solomon & Hart, supra note 13, at 211.
15. FRB Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1972); FRB Reg. G. 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(c) (1972);
FRB Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1972). FRB Reg. T, which covers lejnding by brokers
and dealers, does not contain such a non-purpose exception.
16. See 4 SPECIAL StUDY, supra note 13, at 5.
17. See Solomon and Hart, supra note 13, at 172-73. The absence of an SEC re-
quirement for a minimum margin for carrying securities is to some extent countered
by the fact that the margin is measured not with respect to each individual security pur-
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Fourth, no credit limit at all is imposed on the purchase of securities
used in bona fide arbitrage operations-transactions where securities
are sold between markets or bought with rights to convert or exchange
them for other securities within a specified time period.18
And fifth, investors may borrow beyond the nominal credit limits
by pyramiding their investments. For example, an investment partner-
ship may obtain credit up to FRB limits on its portfolio. An individual
partner may then borrow up to FRB limits on his interest in the part-
nership. He thereby obtains double leverage on one portfolio of securi-
ties. 19
2. The Company Act
The Company Act20 prohibits mutual funds from borrowing from
brokers unless the SEC establishes rules sanctioning and regulating the
practice. It also forbids funds from borrowing through the issuance of
senior securities, and permits borrowing from banks only to the extent
that assets are always at least 800 percent of borrowing.21
Under SEC rules, the funds may borrow only from banks, not from
brokers or any other lender.2 2 The amount borrowed may be included
in assets for purposes of the 300 percent asset coverage requirement.28
As a result, the 300 percent requirement in effect allows a mutual fund
to borrow up to one-third of the value of its securities. 24 Finally, a
chased but rather with respect to a borrower's aggregate indebtedness to a particular
lender. Therefore, provided there are new loans made on newly purchased securities
to a particular lender, the minimum margins on purchase become minimum margins
on carrying securities, since any disparity with the initial purchase margin created by
a fall in the value of securities must be made up before the loan can be extended to
purchase a new security. However, this complication can be avoided by opening up an
account with a new bank or broker. See FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (1972): FRB
Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(d) (1972); FRB Reg. G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(g) (1972); FRB Reg.
X, 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1972).
Stock exchanges, however, ordinarily do prescribe a minimum carrying margin. For
the New York Stock Exchange, it is presently twenty-five percent. Rule 431, NYSE
Guide 2431(b).
18. FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.4(d), 220.8 (1972); FRB Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.2y)
(1972); FRB Reg. X. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1972). The situation is not specifically
covered in FRB Reg. G, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1972).
19. Telephone Interview with Patricia Abelle, Division of Security Credit Regulation,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Jan. 30, 1973.
20. Company Act § 12(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1) (1970).
21. Company Act § 18(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (1970).
22. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7221, at 7 (June 9, 1972) [herein-
after cited as Company Act Rel. No. 7221]. Prior to the original publication of this
position in SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5634 (March 11, 1969) [herein-
after cited as Company Act Rel. No. 5634], the SEC evidently enforced this restriction
administratively through its authority to approve and disapprove prospectuses of mutual
funds. Telephone Interview with SEC staff, supra note 10.
23. Company Act Rel. No. 5634, supra note 22, at 8; SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 7220, at 9 (June 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Company Act Rel. No. 7220J.
24. This is true because a fund with net assets of 100 may borrow 50 and still meet
the 300 percent rule, since 150 = 3 X 50. The same result is achieved by purchasing
shares worth 150 with 100 in net assets at a 66% percent margin, or allowing an in.
vestor to borrow one-third of the value of a security. See note 12 supra.
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mutual fund must comply with the Exchange Act credit limitations set
by the FRB if they are stricter than the 300 percent rule.25
Therefore, ignoring the loopholes in the Exchange Act credit con-
trols, mutual funds are subject to stricter controls whenever the FRB
credit regulations allow more borrowing than the 300 percent rule, and
to equal controls in all other periods. 2( The nominal borrowing limit
set by the FRB has in fact been more liberal for roughly forty percent
of the period from 1940-1973.27
Furthermore, aside from the opportunity for pyramiding-which is
of limited usefulness to the typical mutual fund investor since he is
unable to take advantage of the significant economies of scale in bor-
rowing2 -the loopholes in the scheme of regulation set up by the Ex-
change Act are not paralleled in the Company Act controls. Conse-
quently, the effective credit controls applicable to mutual funds have
at all times been stricter than the controls applicable to other in-
vestors.29
B. Short Sales
The Exchange Act, in addition to prohibiting short selling of a
security when its price is falling, 0 subjects short sales to the FRB credit
controls on normal purchases of securities.3 '
Although the Company Act does not contain any express prohibition
on short selling, it does grant the SEC discretion to prescribe limita-
25. Company Act Rel. No. 7220, supra note 23, at 9.
26. At present the FRB maximum is 35 percent, very dose to the 3316 percent
limitation on mutual funds. For the period 1971-73 the FRB maximum was 45 percent,
far less strict than the 33% percent limit. See FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1972);
2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 22,236 (1973).
27. See note 12 supra.
28. At two brokerage houses, for example, the minimum collateral requirements for
opening a margin account were respectively $2500 and $10,000. In each case interest
rates were on a sliding scale, declining as loan size grew. Telephone Interviews with
representatives of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, and White, Weld & Co.,
New York City, January 29, 1973. Banks follow a similar policy. Telephone Interview
with loan official of Chase Manhattan Bank, January 29, 1973. (The individuals asked
that their names be kept confidential. Records of the interviews are on file with the
Yale Law Journal.) See HESrER & TOBIN, supra note 3, at 41.
29. See note 12 supra. The FRB tends to relax margin controls when it is pursuing
other expansionary policies. Since economic expansions arc usually accompanied by
rises in prices in the securities markets, increased access to securities credit at such time
can be extremely valuable to the investor. See JOINT CoM.MrTEE oN THE EcoNo~sic REroRT,
MONETARY POLICY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEDT, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 408-12 (1952).
30. The so-called "uptick" rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-l(a) (1972). The purpose of the
rule is to prevent accentuation of market declines, the theory being that short selling
in a market decline will accelerate the decline. See 2 SPECIAL STrUDy, supra note 13,
at 246-50.
31. See FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1972).
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tions.32 The SEC has effectively prohibited all borrowing on short sales
by mutual funds. 33
A specific limit on short selling (even without borrowing) to thirty-
five percent of a fund's net assets has been imposed until recently by
formal rule.3 4 In the future, the SEC is expected to enforce a similar
limitation in the approval of registration statements. 3 However, even
if such an administrative limitation were not enforced by the SEC, the
Internal Revenue Code places a severe tax penalty on gains that mutual
funds obtain from short selling which would, in all probability, prevent
a fund from short selling much more than thirty-five percent of its net
assets.3 6
II. Regulation of Mutual Funds: Goals and Results
A. The Goals of the Regulatory Scheme
In passing the Securities Act of 193337 and the Exchange Act, Con-
gress sought to improve the securities markets as an investment vehicle
for the small investor 38 by equalizing the flow of information to sophis-
32. Company Act § 12(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3) (1970).
33. See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5633, at 5.6 (March 11, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Company Act Re. No. 5633]; Company Act Rel. No. 5634, supra
note 22, at 9-10; Company Act Rel. No. 7221, supra note 22, at 6-7. This limitation
is effected by a requirement that mutual funds which sell short maintain at all time.
in a segregated account, in addition to the proceeds of the short sale, an amount it
the form of cash or government securities equal to the difference between the current
price of any security sold short and any margin required by the broker who nego-
tiated the short sale. This is the equivalent of a 100 percent margin requirement for
the purchase and carrying of a security. Presumably, this requirement will limit a
mutual fund with net assets of 100 to short sales of less than 100, since a reserve
must be kept to increase the amount in the segregated account in case the price of
the shorted stocks should rise. Because of the segregated account requirement, bor-
rowings apparently can not be made using the assets in the segregated account as
collateral. However, this point has not been specifically settled. The limitations do not
apply to short sales against the box, that is, short sales when the fund conteinporane.
ously owns an equivalent amount of the securities shorted. Telephone Interview with
SEC staff, supra note 10.
34. Company Act Rel. No. 7221, supra note 22, at 6, 7; Telephone Interview with
SEC staff, supra note 10. The thirty-five percent of net assets restriction was contained
in Company Act Rel. No. 5633, supra note 33, at 5-6.
35. Although the thirty-five percent rule was not officially promulgated until 1969,
it was enforced administratively before then. As of 1972 the rule was dropped, but the
SEC indicates that it may continue to enforce it on the administrative level. Tele-
phone Interview with SEC staff, supra note 10.
36. Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Code], exempt mutual funds from taxation at the corporate level, with
the result that shareholders are taxed only once on their fund income. One of the
conditions of the exemption is that a fund not derive more than thirty percent of its
gross income from the sale of securities held for less than three months. See Code §
851(b). The gains derived from short selling will almost certainly be of such a short
term nature. See Code § 1233 and corresponding Treasury Regulations; PRACrTsNG LAW
INSTITUTE, TAX CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTMENTS 7-28 (1969).
The ordinary investor may, of course, short 100 percent of his assets, including bor-
rowing, since he need only deposit a margin against each short sale. See FRB Reg. T,
12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(d).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act].
38. Congressional investigations in the early 1930's revealed that an inordinate pro.
portion of the gross profits from the securities markets had gone into the pockets of
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ticated and unsophisticated participants in the markets,3a by prohibit-
ing the use of certain investment techniques by sophisticated inves-
tors,4 0 and by limiting the share of gross investment profits that provid-
ers of investment services could claim as compensation. 4'
Passage of the Company Act came in 1940, following an SEC investi-
g-ation of the mutual fund industry42 which revealed that large numbers
of small investors were still not investing directly in the securities mar-
kets because they could not obtain the substantial advantages of diversi-
fication 43 and professional investment management unless they pooled
their money in vehicles such as mutual funds. 44 Although mutual funds
had been characterized by gross mismanagement and heavy losses,43
Congress sought to preserve and regulate the industry so that the small
investor could have effective access to high return/high risk securities
investments as an alternative to the low guaranteed returns offered him
sophisticated participants such as corporate insiders and brokers. As a result small.
unsophisticated investors had lost confidence in the securities markets, and corpora.
tions had lost a potential source of capital. See S. REP. No. 1455. 73d Cong.. 2d Sets. (1934).
39. The Securities Act works to equalize the flow of information by requiring disclosure
by companies at the time of issue of their securities. See Securities Act ? 5. 6. 7. 10.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), (f), (g), 0j) (1970); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. I para. 2
(1933); H.R. RatE. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 para. 1 (1933).
The Exchange Act requires disclosure by brokers and dealers and disclosure in the
after-market (sales after the original issue) by corporations whose stock is traded on
national exchanges. See Exchange Act §§ 6, 12, 13. 14. 15, 15A, 15 US.C. § 78(1), (1).
(i), (n), (o) (1970); S. REP'. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 para. 2, at 9 para. 3 (1931).
Recent amendments to the Exchange Act were also designed to equalize the flow of
information among investors. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 paras. 1-4, at 4
paras. 2, 5 (1963); H.R. Rat'. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 paras. 1, 5 (1964).
40. Certain investment techniques, such as pooling of sales and purchases and trading
on inside information, are especially useful to larger, more sophisticated in estors. The
Exchange Act limits the use of such techniques. See Exchange Act §§ 9. 10. 16. 15 U..C.
§§ 78(i), 0), (p) (1970); S. REP. No. 792. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 para. 2, at 7, 8. 9 (193-);
H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 para. 3 (1934).
41. See Exchange Act § 19(b)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(s)(b)(g) (1970); see S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). In recent cases the SEC and the courts have also relied upon
the securities acts' "equal opportunity goal" in making decisions in technical areas not
covered directly by statute. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur. 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For an excellent discussion of
the equal opportunity goal and its possible limitations in the context of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, see A. BRO MBEREG, SEcuRTIs LAw: Fnto-SEC RrL lOb-5
§§ 3.2 & 12.2 (1971). .
42. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 para. I, at 6 para. 4; 4 SEC. REroIr
ON THE STUDY OF INvEsTMENT TRusTs AND INvFs.%TMENT COsPA.NIEs 371-73 (1934-42) [here.
inafter cited as TRusT STUDY]. It should be noted that ch. V11 of pt. 3. as well as pts.
4 & 5, were not submitted to Congress until after the passage of the Company Act and
cannot, therefore, be relied on as legislative history. lor a list of dates of delivery of
the various parts of the Trust Study, see Note, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer Profits:
Congress, The SEC, and Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 V.. L. Rav. 371, 373-74 n.16 (1972).
43. Diversification refers to the practice of investing a portfolio in a number of
different securities rather than in a single security. It can be demonstrated that by so
doing an investor can reduce the risk on his investment without correspondingly re-
ducing expected return. See note 72 infra.
44. Investment advisors normally require a very large minimum portfolio before
they will undertake to manage it. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subconin. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 286 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
1940 Senate Hearings].
45. See 4 TRust STUDY, supra note 42, at 371-73; 3 id. at 20-.3; 1940 Senate Hearings
37-39, 788-98.
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by savings banks and other financial intermediaries. 40 To repeated ob-
jections in the Senate that some controls should be put on the riskiness
of securities that a mutual fund could buy,47 the SEC replied that the
purpose of the Company Act was not to dictate the riskiness of securi-
ties to be purchased by a mutual fund as long as the investment policy
was disclosed to investors before they purchased shares in the fund.48
The SEC view prevailed, and the Company Act placed no limits on
purchases of individual securities according to riskiness, although, to
protect small investors, the Act equalized the flow of information be-
tween them and more sophisticated participants in the securities mar-
kets, 49 prohibited the use of certain investment techniques,00 and con-
trolled the compensation of providers of investment services.0 '
Nonetheless, the legislative history indicates that Congress' motiva-
tion in approving the leveraging controls was to limit risk. The legis-
lators' theory was apparently that leveraging would accentuate the
effect of price movements in market downswings on funds' perform-
ance, thereby increasing the danger of bankruptcy.52 It was felt that
controls on leveraging, unlike limits on purchases of risky securities,
would not foreclose the possibility of high returns. The SEC's Trust
Study, 3 which served as the empirical foundation for the Company
Act, purported to find a strong correlation for the 1930-1935 market
between poor performance by mutual funds and bank debt. 4 Evidently
46. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 para. 1, at 6 para. 4, at 11 para. 5,
at 12 para. 1 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); COMPANY GRowTII
REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-3. 1 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 369.70; 4 id. at 273-77;
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Scss.,
pt. 2, at 286.
47. See 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 233, 286; Hearings on H.R. 10065
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th
Cong., 3d Sess. 112 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 House HearingsJ.
48. 1940 Senate Hearings 233. The SEC now regulates the purchase of risky securities
in a haphazard and indirect way by preventing mutual funds from having more than
ten percent of their assets in illiquid investments-i.e., investments for which there is
no established trading market, such as real estate investments or letter stock which
has not been registered with the SEC. See Company Act Rel. No. 7221, supra note 22,
at 8-10. Such a restriction does not effectively limit risk-taking since there are many
high risk securities traded on the OTC market. See Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
49. See Company Act §§ l(b)(1), 8, 29, 30, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b)(1), -8, -29, -10; S.
REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-8 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
8.10 (1940).
50. See Company Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 6, 7, 15 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8, 9, 26 (1940).
51. See Company Act §§ 15, 22(b), 27(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15, -22(b), -27(f) (1970);
H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 6, 9 (1940).
52. See 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 288, 1027-31; Company Act § 1(b)(7),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-=(b)(7) (1970).
53. Note 42 supra.
54. The SEC's results on leverage in general, including leverage by issuance of senior
securities, bank borrowing, and other forms of borrowing are containcd in 2 TtusT STUDY,
supra note 42, at 478-79. Those on bank debt are in 2 TRosr STUDY 474, 921-23. Tile
Trust Study results suggested a ranking of the three forms of leveraging in descending
order of ill effect: (1) senior securities, (2) bank borrowing, and (3) margin. See 2 TRuSr
STUDY 474, 478-79, 921-23; 3 id. at 1583-94; notes 50-53 supra.
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Congress concluded that leveraging could only cause net losses for
mutual fund shareholders.
The Company Act itself did not limit short selling by mutual funds
but gave the SEC discretion to do so.as As is apparent from SEC com-
mentary, the limitations actually adopted were intended to limit risk;
the SEC's reasoning was that while potential loss on an ordinary pur-
chase of securities is limited to the purchase price of the security, the
potential loss on a short sale is unlimited since the security's price may
rise indefinitely. 0 Neither Congress nor the SEC gave any indication
that it expected short selling controls to impair a fund's ability to ob-
tain high returns in the securities markets.
B. The Recent Revolt Against the Funds: the Performance Problem
Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, the system appeared to function
admirably as increasing numbers of small investors sought the invest-
ment benefits provided by mutual funds.Y1 However, in the 1960's sev-
eral studies indicated that the supposed advantages of mutual funds
might not be nearly so substantial as had been thought.A The studies,
although differing on specific figures, agreed that the funds generally
did not perform better than collections of securities chosen at ran-
dom.59 Moreover, where funds did perform well, the gains were often
55. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3). In passing the Exchange Act controls on short selling.
and presumably also in passing the Company Act controls, Congress' rationale was that
short selling accentuated downward price movements, causing margin purchasers to de-
fault on their loans and thereby further accentuating the price decline. Short selling
was also associated with trading on the basis of inside information. See S. REP,. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 50-54 (1934); 2 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 246.94.
An SEC study of the role of short selling in the 1962 market break indicated that
short selling did accentuate market declines and recommended that the SEC increase
the level of its controls. See 2 SPECLAL STUDY 246-94. Similar results were reported in
Seneca, Short Interest: Bearish or Bullish, 22 J. FINANCE 67 (1967). Another study's
results were more indefinite, however. See F. MA AwUAY, SHORT SELUNG ON T :l NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANCE (1951).
56. See Company Act Rel. No. 7221, supra note 22.
57. See IxvMrMENT Co. INSTITUTE, MANAGF- EENT I, vEsr.,rm r Co.,t* xurs 88.91 (1962);
C.F.A. RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INVESTMEN 'T COMPANY PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT Xjii-_Xi
(1970) [hereinafter cited as C.F.A. PORTFOLIO STUDY].
58. See I. FRIEND, Mf. BLUME & J. CROCKETr, M %UTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTUTIONAL
INvEsroRs (1970) [hereinafter cited as FRIEND STUDY]; 2 INSrrUTIoNAL STUDY, supra note
6, at 325-32; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FuNis,
H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON STUDY].
59. WHARTON STUDY 17-18; FRIEND STUDY 50-69. A number of earlier studies of mu-
tual fund performance, e.g., Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 1966 J. Bus. 119 (19A&S;
Jenson, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-64, 1968 J. FINANCE 389
(1968); Treynor & Mazuy, Can Mutual Funds Outguess the Marhet?, HARv. Bus. RE.,
July-Aug. 1960, at 131, also concluded that mutual funds, before expenses, underper-
formed unmanaged portfolios or broad market indices, creating the clear impression
that an investor could do as well as the average mutual fund by throwing darts at the
stock market page. But see 2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 325-32, which found
a slight tendency for funds on the average to outperform unmanaged portfolios.
The general conclusion of the studies was buttressed by two subsidiary conclusions.
First, although funds which invested in riskier assets were able to outperform more
conservative funds and sometimes market averages, their superiority tended to disappear
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offset, at least in part, by inordinately high management and transac-
tions costs.0°
As this information was disseminated, the growth rate of the funds
began to slow.61 In 1972, the growth rate for the industry as a whole
became negative, with net redemptions exceeding purchases by $1.7
billion. 2 Large numbers of investors, especially those willing to take
higher risks to achieve higher returns, apparently ceased using mutual
funds.03
In response, Congress and the SEC sought to improve the funds' per-
formance by reducing the management, selling, and transaction costs
of funds.0 4 To date, these measures apparently have had no major
effect.05 What has escaped notice so far is that the poor performance of
the funds may well be due, at least in part, to the strict controls on
leverage and short selling to which the funds have been subjected.
III. Portfolio Theory and the Stricter Controls on Mutual Funds
Analysis of the special controls on mutual funds in the light of eco-
nomic theory indicates that their effects have been quite contrary to
those anticipated by Congress: they do not, in fact, place a ceiling on
risk-taking; rather, they simply act as a barrier to good performance,
when compared to a randomly chosen portfolio of similar volatility. FRIEND STUDY 59;
2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY 325-32. Second, the ability of individual funds to outperform
random portfolios in given years also seemed to be a random event. That is, very few
funds seemed to have the ability consistently to outperform random portfolios of the
same risk level. WHARTON STUDY 19; 2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY 325-32.
60. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 1110 (1972).
61. See C.F.A. PORTFOLIO STUDY, supra note 57, at xxi-xxii. See also Revolt Against the
Funds, FORTUNE, Dec. 1971, at 165-66. There were, of course, additional reasons for the
growth slowdown, the most significant of which was increased competition from other
financial intermediaries. It is not possible to allocate any specific portion of the growth
slowdown to poor performance, although it almost certainly played a part. See BUSINESS
WEEK, March 3, 1973, at 48-52.
62. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 26, col. 3.
63. See Revolt Against the Funds, FORTUNE, Dec. 1971, at 165.66. A recent SEC
study indicated that the revolt may be confined for the most part to the riskier funds,
with the lower risk funds continuing to grow. See N.Y. Times, March 15, 1973, at 63,
cols. 4-6; note 4 supra.
64. The Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat.
1413 (1970), made changes in the Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-I to - 21 to give the SEC increased powers over advisory fees payable
by mutual funds and sales fees payable by investors. See Manges, The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, 26 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 91-1382,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REv.
No. 91-1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Conf. 1970); SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
6336 (Feb. 2, 1971); COMPANY GROWTH REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-32. The SEC has
eliminated fixed brokerage fees on sales and purchases of large blocks of stock. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9079 (Feb. 11, 1971); 4 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY,
supra note 6, at 2183-84; 5 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 171; Note, Conflict of Interest
in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YALE L.J. 372, 380-81 (1970);
Russo & Wang, The Structure of the Securities Market-Past and Future, 41 FORDIIAM
L. REV. 1 (1972).
65. For the thirteenth consecutive month as of February 1973, net mutual fund re-
demptions exceeded sales. See Wall St. J., March 22, 1973, at 14, col. 3. But see note
63 supra.
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forcing mutual funds to take higher risks than would otherwise be
necessary to achieve a given return.
A. Portfolio Theory and Efficient Risk Taking
Economists have developed a body of theory, now widely accepted,
which makes it possible to analyze investments in risky assets in terms
of efficiency."0
The theory is based on four principles. First, it is assumed that indi-
vidual investors seek to minimize risk and maximize return on invest-
ments. 67 The most efficient investments in risky assets such as stocks
will therefore be those which produce the maximum return at each
level of risk; all other investments can be dismissed as inefficient be-
cause they force an investor to take higher risks than necessary to
achieve a given level of return. 8 Thus, by locating undervalued or
overvalued securities-that is, securities on which the market has fixed
a mistakenly low or high price given the riskiness they involve-an
investor can increase the efficiency of his investments. 0
Second, if the choice is among efficient securities, a higher return on
an investment can normally be obtained only by taking higher risks. 0
Third, risk is appropriately measured only with respect to an inves-
tor's entire portfolio of investments, rather than for each individual
security. Thus, a portfolio equally divided between savings bonds and
high risk securities might well subject an investor to the same risk level
as a portfolio consisting entirely of medium risk securities.7 1 Further-
more, since the prices of the several securities in a portfolio may vary
66. The foundations for portfolio theory are contained in Tobin, Liquidity Preference
as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REv. Ecox. STUDiEs 65 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Tobin,
Liquidity]; H. MAxownz, PORTFOLIO SELEaCTbo: EFFicJENT DiF sIsFIjcATION OF IN1EST-
mENTS (1959) [hereinafter cited as H. MARKowrrz, PORTFOLJOS]. Recent developmnents are
summarized in K. SmrmH, PORTFOLIO MAANAGEE.\%E:T (1971): J. WHA5SON, TEaNqUES,
supra note 5. An easily comprehensible presentation of the basic elements of portfolio
theory can be found in Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE
L.J. 1604 (1971).
Although there is some debate on the techniques to be used in the actual selection of
portfolios under the theory, the broad outlines are accepted without question by econ-
omists. The debate centers on the measurement of expected return and risk, with
some contending that past price movements alone are a useful guide while others con-
tend that such measurements must be combined with subjective estimates of future price
movements in order to be meaningful, and still others contend that no exact measure-
ments of risk and return can be obtained although an investor can get a general picture.
See D. FARRAR, THE INVEsrMENT DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1965); S.mI, Po TFouo
MANAGE.ENT, supra, at 3-7; Friend & Blume, Measurement of Portfolio Performance
under Uncertainty, 60 Am. ECON. Rav. 561. 561-62 (1970); Joyce & Vogel, The Uncertainty
in Risk: Is Variance Unambiguous, 25 J. FINANCE 127. 127-.28 (1970); Cohen & logue,
An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative Portfolio.Selection Models, 40 J. Bus. 166 (1967).
67. Empirical evidence of the risk aversion characteristic of investors is contained in
Sharpe, Risk-Aversion in the Stock Market: Some Empirical Evidence, 20 J. FINANCE
416 (1965); J. WiLAmsoN, TECHNIQUES, supra note 5, at 30-32.
-68. See K. SMIrr, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 71-75.
69. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 96-97. But see note 86 infra.
70. See Sharpe, supra note 67, at 416; Friend & Blume, supra note 66.
71. See H. MARKowrrz, PORTFoLIoS, supra note 66, at 112-15.
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in different directions, or at least at different rates over time, the riski-
ness of the whole portfolio is typically less than the average riskiness of
its securities. The expected return on a whole portfolio, on the other
hand, is merely the weighted average of the expected returns on the
securities composing it. Therefore, diversifying a portfolio among vari-
ous securities, instead of investing in only one kind of security, will typi-
cally reduce the risk an investor must bear to attain any given expected
return on his portfolio.72
Through selection of under- and over-valued securities and through
diversification, efficient portfolios of risky investments can be con-
structed at each level of risk.73 But a fourth principle of portfolio the-
72. Assume a portfolio consisting of only two stocks. If the rates of return on the
stocks are perfectly correlated, the variance (risk) in the portfolio rate of return is the
same as the variance for each stock and nothing is gained from combining them. If
there is perfect negative correlation, the variance in the portfolio rate of return is
completely eliminated. If the returns on the stocks are completely unrelated, the vari.
ance in the portfolio rate of return is only half the variance of each stock alone.
Although perfectly negatively correlated securities are difficult to locate, securities
that show less than perfect positive correlation, or no correlation, in their rates of re-
turn appear to be fairly common. The overall risk level of a portfolio therefore call
be reduced by including within it increasing numbers of securities, and thus increasing
the chances that the variance in the rate of return for any given security will be com.
pensated for by the variance in the others. For practical purposes, however, the ad-
vantages that can be obtained from diversifying a portfolio in this fashion beyond the
point where the portfolio contains roughly twenty securities appear to be negligible.
See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 126-31; J. WILLIAMSON, TEcII-
NIQUES, supra note 5, at 120-21; Evans & Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of
Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. FINANCE 761 (1968); Mao, Essentials of Portfolio
Diversification Strategy, 25 J. FINANCE 1109 (1970). The impact of short selling on di-
versification is discussed in note 82 inIra.
73. That is, one can construct an efficiency frontier, as shown in Graph I, which
displays, for each level of risk, the maximum expected return that can be obtained





As expected, a higher return can be obtained only by assuming higher risks. Portfolios
A and B are both diversified and maximize return at their respective levels of risk, A
being low risk and B being high risk. Portfolio C is inefficient, either because it is not
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ory, the "separation theorem," holds that, once the possibilities of bor-
rowing and lending are added to the possibility of acquiring risky
assets, it will be possible to locate a unique, "most efficient" portfolio
of risky assets. This unique portfolio will be the best choice for an
investor, regardless of the level of risk he desires. If the investor de-
sires a lower level of risk than that of the unique portfolio, he should
place only part of his funds in that portfolio, and place the rest in risk-
free investments such as a savings account or United States Savings
Bonds. Or, more importantly for the discussion here, if an investor
desires a higher risk and return level than that afforded by the unique
portfolio, it will be more efficient for him to leverage that portfolio
rather than to invest in a different portfolio with a higher risk level.74
diversified or because it includes securities that do not offer maximum return for the
level of risk they involve. Portfolio D would be more efficient but there are no risky
assets to be purchased which allow an investor to achieve that low a level of risk for
that high a return.
The empirical derivation of an efficiency frontier for the 1901-66 market is demon-
strated in K. SrrH, PORTFOLIO MANAGE.MENT, supra note 66. at 126-44.
74. In Graph II below, the unique "most efficient" portfolio is portfolio C, located
at the point where the line RQ is tangent to the frontier of efficient portfolios ST, see
note 73 supra. Point R gives the return on a risk-free investment. (It is assumed here






Portfolios along the line CR can be obtained by combining risk-free assets with
portfolio C, and portfolios along CQ can be obtained by leveraging portfolio C.
Portfolios A and B are at the same risk level, but portfolio B is obtained by leveraging
portfolio C while portfolio A is obtained by simply forming an efficient portfolio which
contains riskier securities than those contained in portfolio C. Portfolio B, which gives the
higher return of the two, is obviously more efficient.
An explanation of the relative efficiency of leveraging as a means of increasing risk
in portfolios at risk levels at or above that of portfolio C is contained in HEsTER & Ton,
supra note 3, at 45-46.
This process of selecting the "most efficient" portfolio, according to the so-called
separation theorem, does not necessarily imply that the same portfolio of risky securities
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Within this theoretical framework, a mutual fund can enable an
investor to make more efficient investments by using superior invest-
ment analysis to locate under- and over-valued securities, by diversify-
ing his portfolio, by using riskless investment or leverage (at more at-
tractive interest rates than those available to individuals) in combi-
nation with the unique portfolio of risky securities, and by taking
advantage of scale economies in advisory and brokerage services1 5
B. Implications for the Company Act Controls
Because leveraging and the purchase of higher risk securities are both
means of increasing risk and return, the Company Act controls on lev-
eraging do not serve as an effective ceiling on risk-taking; mutual funds
remain free to increase the risk level of their portfolios by purchasing
higher risk securities.70 In fact, the primary effect of the stricter con-
trols on leveraging applied to mutual funds is simply to hurt perform-
ance by forcing inefficient risk-taking. Increasing risk by leveraging
the unique portfolio is more efficient than increasing risk by acquiring
a portfolio of securities of a higher risk level than those making up tile
unique portfolio."
is best for all investors. One man's best portfolio may differ from another's at any
given point in time because of tax considerations, transaction costs, and non.securlty
risky assets. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 139-40, 203-07. More.
over, even for one given investor, the composition of the best risky portfolio may
vary over time as economic conditions change and the securities market reaches new
equilibria. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 141-49; J. WVILLIAMSON, TECHNIQUES,
supra note 5, at 106-09; B. STONE, RISK, RETURN, AND EQUILIBRIUMI (1970). The foundation
for the determination of a unique solution can be found in Sharpe, A Simplified Model
for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 277 (1963). See also Fama, Risk, Return,
& Equilibrium, 79 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1971). A unique solution is possible, however, only
if the borrowing and lending rates are assumed to be equal. If borrowing and lending
rates differ, as they normally will, a number of solutions are possible, depending on
whether an investor wants to adjust the risk level of his portfolio upward or downward.
See J. WILLIAMSON, TECHNIQUES 106-08.
75. See Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119, 120 (1966); pp. 1309 & 1314
supra. By pooling their investments in vehicles such as mutual funds, small investors
should be able to take advantage of such economies.
Indeed, there is evidence that many mutual fund investors who are seeking low risk
investments are taking advantage of economies of scale by investing in funds specializing
in the purchase of corporate bonds available only to large-scale investors. See Wall St.
J., Jan. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
76. But see note 48 supra.
77. In terms of Graph I, supra note 74, the effect of the controls on leveraging Is
to place a limit on the extent to which a mutual fund can increase risk and return by
following line CQ; funds seeking higher risk and returns are thus forced to shift to
the less efficient strategy of advancing along the frontier CT by purchasing a portfolio
containing higher-risk securities than does portfolio C.
The margin controls applied to all investors under the Exchange Act have the same
general effect, but since they are generally less strict than the controls applied to
mutual funds, see p. 1309 supra, most investors have the advantage of being able to
move further along CQ than can mutual funds.
There is some evidence that controls on access of all investors to credit can be bene-
ficial by reducing overall risk levels in the economy. See ECONOMIC POLICY AND TIlE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 206-07 (H. Manne ed. 1969). But see Moore,
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Furthermore, forcing funds to seek higher returns by purchasing
high risk securities rather than by leveraging probably increases the
danger of bankruptcy. Not only will the purchase of high risk securities
needlessly increase the volatility of a fund's portfolio, but in addition
such purchases are likely to make the fund's portfolio less liquid, since
high risk securities tend to become illiquid in market downturns. 8
Finally, by limiting the extent to which investors can borrow through
the mutual fund vehicle, the controls prevent small investors from
taking advantage of economies of scale in borrowing.71
The limits on short selling, evaluated as risk controls, are equally
unfortunate. Since the price movements of many securities are posi-
tively correlated, short selling a substantial fraction of gross assets will
probably reduce risk rather than increase it.80 If undervalued securities
can be located, short selling may be a more efficient means of reducing
risk than adding risk-free investments to the most efficient portfolio.8'
Stock Market Margin Requirements, 74 J. PoL. Eco.N. 158 (196). Indeed. reduction of
market volatility was one of the stated reasons for passage of the Exchange Act's controls
on securities credit. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banhing and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6495 (1934); 4 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 13, at 2-3; 2 id.
at 9-15.
78. See Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6. An inability to sell illiquid portfolio
investments such as letter stock or very risky over-the-counter stock may very well render
a fund incapable of redeeming the securities of its investors during a period of market
decline, thereby forcing it into bankruptcy. Illiquid investments also cannot be sold
to cover a margin call in a falling market.
79. See note 28 supra. In terms of Graph II, supra note 74, the effect of obtaining
lower interest rates for borrowing is to shift line CQ downward to the right, and thus
to permit an investor to leverage with even greater efficiency.
80. K. SMrrH, PoRTFOLIo MANAGEMENT, supra note 65, at 142-43, provides an empirical
demonstration for the 1961-66 market showing that short selling approximately forty
percent of gross assets would reduce risk.
81. This possibility is illustrated below:
Risk I
GRAPH it T 0
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Finally, short selling probably will enable an investor to obtain the
benefits of diversification less expensively.82
Short selling may also be necessary to purchase the most efficient
portfolio. 2 This will be especially true if a general market downturn
can be foreseen . 3 In such a case, short selling 100 percent of gross
assets may be the proper strategy.84 Further, by combining leveraged
long purchases of securities with short sales of equivalent investments,
investors may also be able to obtain risk-free returns from arbitrage
operations.8 5 To the extent that the stricter controls on mutual funds
limit the use of short selling, they thus may force the funds to take
unnecessary risks.86
The usual effect of short selling is to extend the efficiency frontier ST to the left,
as shown. See note 74 supra. The shape of the frontier was derived empirically In K.
SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 142-43, from data for the 1961.66
market. As expected in a generally rising market, adding short sales up to nearly half
of the portfolio will reduce risk, although reducing risk by adding risk-free assets to
portfolio C is clearly a more efficient means of risk reduction (that is, reducing risk
along RC is more efficient than reducing risk along SC). However, there is some evi-
dence that by finding longs and shorts with sufficiently negatively correlated returns,
investors may be able to acquire portfolios along CP more efficient than those along
CR. See Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE, April 1966, at 237. Mc-
Donald & Baron, Risk and Return on Short Positions in Common Stocks, 28 J. FINANCE
97 (1973). But see note 86 infra.
82. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 126-31; HESTER 86 TOBIN,
supra note 3, at 41-50; note 72 supra; V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE
995-98 (1972).
Short selling will enable the investor to add securities with negatively correlated re-
turns to his portfolio. This will permit the investor to achieve the optimal benefits of
diversification by holding fewer securities than he would if he could acquire only se-
curities with independent or positive covariance. Because he holds fewer securities, his
management costs will be lower.
83. If short sales offer a higher return at a given level of risk than normal .pur.
chases, they will be more efficient investments. See HESTR & TOBIN, supra note 3, at
41-50. But see note 86 infra. In a general market downturn the prices of most stocks
will be moving downward. It will be more difficult than not in such a situation to
find securities whose prices will rise.
84. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 66, at 143-44.
85. Empirical studies have shown that securities which should have the same price
in the market, such as common stock and bonds convertible into that common stock,
or options to buy or sell common stock (calls or puts) and common stock, often do not
have equivalent prices because of imperfections in the market. By shorting the over-
valued security and purchasing the undervalued one, an investor can make a risk-free
gain. See E. THORP & S. KASSOUF, BEAT THE MARKET: A SCIENTIFIC STOCK MARKET SYSTEM(1967) [hereinafter cited as THORP & KASSOUF]. Although the SEC's controls on short
selling do contain an exception for arbitrage operations, the tax rules do not. See
Company Act Rel. No. 7221, supra note 22, at 7; note 36 supra. In addition, the stricter
controls on leveraging will prevent a mutual fund from engaging in arbitrage operations
to the same extent that other investors can. See pp. 1308 & 1309 supra.
86. A body of economic theory, the theory of efficient markets, supported by an
impressive amount of empirical data, indicates that, because of the speed with which
securities prices adapt to new information, it is impossible to find undervalued or over-
valued securities. See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theoretical and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970). One would expect that if the efficient
markets theory is correct, speculative short selling would be unprofitable in a gen-
erally rising market such as that of the past twenty years. Such, indeed, is the result
of empirical tests of the profitability of short positions. However, even under such a
theory, short selling can still be useful for diversification, risk reduction, and risk and
non-risk arbitrage purposes. See McDonald & Baron, supra note 77; note 77 supra;
notes 89-91 infra.
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C. Empirical Evidence Supporting the Theoretical Conclusions
These theoretical expectations are supported by empirical evidence,
although the data are by no means conclusive.
Since 1950 sophisticated investors have employed a number of in-
vestment techniques that depend heavily upon leverage and short sell-
ing. These techniques include leveraged long purchasesS T pure short
selling,88 hedging,8 9 convertible arbitrage,00 and risk arbitrage.0' Be-
cause none of the investors specializing in such techniques is subject
to disclosure requirements concerning performance, and because none
of the securities acts requires 'disclosure by technique, complete data
on the performance of such investors cannot be readily obtained. No
specific data are available on relative risk levels, and so a strict per-
formance comparison cannot be made. 2 Nonetheless, the available evi-
dence9 3 indicates that investors who are not subject to the strict limita-
87. This technique involves borrowing as much money as is permitted by the
margin rules to buy stocks.
88. The term "pure short selling," as used here, refers to short selling in search of
a profit rather than short selling to reduce risk. See, e.g., Looking for Losers-Short
Seller Berman Strikes Gold Picking Stocks on the Way Down, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1970,
at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Berman Losers].
89. Hedging is a technique developed by A. W. Jones to allow the investor to benefit
from both upturns and downturns in the market by leveraing long as much as pos.
sible in the upswings and leveraging shorts in the downswings. An attempt is made
to combine overvalued securities of low volatility in market upswings and high volatility
in market downswings with undervalued securities of high volatility in market upswings
and low volatility in market downswings. By so doing, risk may be reduced while al-
lowing the investor to profit both from upswings and downswings.
For general information on the hedging technique and A. W. Jones, see PRACTmSNG
LAW INSTITUTE, INvESrgMENT PARTNERSHIP AND OFFSHORE INvEsr.crF FUNDs (1969) [here-
inafter cited as PLI, PARTNERSHIPS]; Berkowitz, Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 SE-
cugrrs REG. 961 (Jan. 17, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Berkowitz, Hedge Funds]; Hawes.
Hedge Funds-Investment Clubs for the Rich, 23 Bus. L,,w. 576 (1968); Hedge Fund
Miseries, FORTUNE, May 1971, at 269; Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up W%'ith, FoTUNE,
April 1966, at 237 [hereinafter cited as Loomis, Jones]; Loomis, Hard Times Come to
the Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, Jan. 1970, at 100 [hereinafter cited as Loomis, Hard Times];
M. Rieger, Hedge Funds-Prospects for Private Investment Partnerships Employing Specu-
lative Techniques, 51 CH. BAR REc. 469 (1970).
90. See note 85 supra.
91. Risk arbitrage is a technique developed during the 1960's when large numbers
of corporate mergers were taking place. In order to bring about acceptance of the mer-
ger by the acquired firm, the acquiring firm would always have to offer higher than
market prices for the shares of the acquired company. As a result, it was found that
during merger negotiations which appeared to be successful, the market price of the
shares of the acquired company would rise slightly, while the price of the shares of
the acquiring company would fall slightly. By highly leveraging shorts of the acquiring
company and longs of the acquired company, a substantial profit could be made if
the merger were achieved. See STAFF OF ANTITRUST SuncoMm. OF HousE JUDICLAM" Coms.,
92D CONG., 1sr SESS., INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 1-7, 195-99 (Comnm. Print.
1971) [hereinafter cited as CONGLOME. TE INvEsr.GTION]; G. WYsER-PRATrE, RISx Ar-
TRAGE (1971).
92. See note 6 supra.
93. Reports on the activities of certain skilled investors and investment managers in-
dicate that pure short selling, risk arbitrage, and convertible hedging have been em-
ployed with enormous success. See Berman Losers, supra note 88; CONGLoMtEATE IN-
VESTIGATION, supra note 91, at 195-99; Thorp & Kassouf, supra note 85, at 3, App. E.
Thorp and Kassouf indicate that over a ten-year period the convertible arbitrage tech-
nique was able to register, without exposure to risk, a gain before expenses of 700 percent.
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tions of the Company Act have been able to use these techniques to
secure substantially better returns than those obtained by mutual
funds.
The most specific information available concerns "hedge funds"-
limited investment partnerships composed of small groups of sub-
stantial investors employing sophisticated investment techniques.
Hedge funds94 have succeeded in avoiding SEC regulation under the
Company Act,05 and data collected by the SEC indicate that they have
exploited their enhanced flexibility by engaging in borrowing and
short selling much more heavily than the mutual funds.90
Data available on the A. W. Jones Fund, the largest of the hedge
funds, indicate that it had returns far higher than the best mutual fund
for each of the periods 1949-68, 1951-70, and 1961-70. 97 Also, by judi-
94. See note 89 supra. Use of hedge funds is effectively limited to substantial investors
by very high investment requirements-usually at least $100,000. See Loomis, Jones, sispra
note 89; Loomis, Hard Times, supra note 89; 2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY, Supra note 6,
at 290-91.
95. The hedge funds have been able to avoid classification as investment companies
for purposes of the Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code by claiming to fit
within the § 3(c)(1) exception of the Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1970), since
they are not making a public offering and have less than 100 shareholders. See I'L, PART-
NERSHIPS, supra note 89, at 319-20; pp. 1308-10 supra.
96. 2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 294-97. The portfolio manager of one mtu-
tual fund attempting to use the convertible arbitrage technique indicated that lie found
it almost impossible to operate under the SEC's leverage and short selling restrictions.
He was continuing to operate one fund but was forced to terminate another because
of SEC restrictions. Telephone Interview with J. L. Alliger, Investment Manager of Con-
vertible Leverage Fund, Jan. 29, 1973. Another fund manager attempting to use shorting
both in its pure form and as a risk-reducing mechanism found the SEC's short-selling
restrictions extremely burdensome. Telephone Interview with Peter Vlacuse, Investment
Manager of Dreyfus Leverage Fund, Jan. 29, 1973.
97. A. W. Jones had an overall gain of approximately 4400 precent for the period 1949-
68, 2800 percent for the period 1951-70, and over 600 percent for the period 1961-70. See
Prospectus of Hedged Investors, Inc. 5-7 (1968); Annual Report of A.W. Jones Fund,
March 30, 1970, on file at Yale Law Journal. The mutual funds for which data are
available with the highest returns over these periods had gains of approximately 2600
percent for the period 1949-68 (T. R. Price Fund); 1300 percent for the period 1951-70
(Dreyfus Fund), and 375 percent for the period 1961-70 (Fidelity Fund). See 14 FUND-
sCoPE 63 (1971).
Jones was apparently able to achieve very stable performance levels, avoiding losses
in two out of the three major market declines of the period. Therefore, in retrospect,
it appears that for all periods but 1969-70, Jones was able to maintain a fairly low
risk level.
The data were compiled according to the same principles, with expenses deducted
and all gains and dividends reinvested. In fact, the data are prejudiced in favor of
the mutual funds in two ways: first, hedge funds have a much larger expense ratio than
the average mutual fund. See 2 INSTITUTIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 300-02. Second,
the hedge fund's gain for the periods 1951-70 and 1961-70 is computed only to April
30, 1970, while the mutual funds' gains are computed to December 31, thus taking into ac-
count almost all of the 1970 decline in the hedge fund's performance and including all
of the 1970 market rise in the mutual funds' performance. The market performance
data for 1970 are contained in A. WIESENERGER & CO., INVESrMENT COMANIuS 1971, at 21
(1971).
Of course, such a performance comparison suffers from several weaknesses. First, It
would be preferable to compare average mutual fund performance with average hedge
fund performance. However, sufficient data are not available for such purposes. Second,
some leading academic authorities on mutual funds have recommended that performance
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cious use of short selling, A. W. Jones was able to avoid losses in the
market decline of 1962 and even to make profits in the market decline
of 1966.98 Using similar techniques, another hedge fund was able to
avoid losses in the market decline of 1969-70.0 In all these periods,
mutual funds generally fared badly.'00
The detrimental impact of the restrictions is further illustrated by
the experience of a number of mutual funds known as "go-go funds,"
which were formed in the 1960's to seek the higher returns offered by
high risk investment.' 0 ' After leveraging to Company Act limits, they
purchased large amounts of very high risk securities.10 2 In the 1969-70
market decline they lost heavily,10 3 and many came close to bankruptcy
because of the illiquidity of their portfolios. 04 While relaxation of the
Company Act controls alone might not have altered this behavior, the
figures be adjusted to reflect degree of risk taken by a fund. See Friend & Blume, supra
note 66, at 561. Presumably, the performance of Jones and of mutual funds Would have
to be similarly adjusted. Again, however, sufficient data arc not available to do so.
Finally, it is impossible to exclude all other variables, such as superior access to inside
information and superior investment skill, and therefore impossible to render a con-
clusive judgment.
98. See Loomis, Jones, supra note 89, at 247.
99. See Hedge Fund Miseries, FORTUNE, May 1971, at 269. The fund was Steinhardt,
Fine, & Berkowitz.
100. For confirmation that mutual funds suffered large losses in the 1962, 1966. and
1969-70 market declines, see the charts of performance of 200 of the more significant
funds in A. NVIFSE.NBERC.R & CO., INvEsr.TMENT CO.MP.ANIES 195-361 (1963); id. at 137-264
(1967); id. at 145-306 (1971).
101. C.F.A. PORTFOLIO STUDY, supra note 57, at 61-76; Bid, Investment Problems and
Prospects, Co.e. FIN. CHR., June 12, 1969, at 1, col. 1; Bingham, Relative Perforiance-Non-
sense, FIN. ANALYsTs J., July-Aug. 1966, at 101; Owens, Mutual Funds and the "Letter
Stock" Problem, Co.i. FIN. CHR., July 31, 1969, at 22, col. 1; The Sixties: Performance
is no Longer a Dirty Word, FormEs, Jan. 1, 1970, at 223.
102. See 2 INSTrrrUTONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 284-85, 294-96.
It appears that hedge funds, in addition to borrowing more heavily than the go-go
funds as would be expected from an efficiency analysis, also tended on the average to
purchase the same categories of high risk stock. On the basis of an efficiency anal)sis
of investments, several explanations for this behavior are possible. First, both the
go-go funds and the hedge funds borrowed to their respectile limits under the Com-
pany Act and Exchange Act restrictions and then, seeking still higher risk and return,
added riskier stocks to their portfolios. See note 101 supra. Second, as a further ex-
planation, both may have chosen to purchase the riskier securities because they were
capable of locating undervalued securities among them and, as a result, able to re-
ceive higher than expected returns for those levels of risk. There is empirical evidence
that this explanation is correct in FRIEND STUDY, supra note 59, at 80-90. However, there
is also evidence that such a strategy is no longer possible since the riskier issues appear
now to be overvalued. See Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6. The historical evidence
indicates that there will be periods when it is possible to locate undervalued risky se-
curities and periods when it is not possible. See Friend & Blume, supra note 66, at 570-71.
Whichever explanation is valid, it is clear that there will be periods when leveraging
will be a superior form of risk-taking, and that during those periods mutual funds may
be forced into inefficient risk-taking at an earlier point than large, sophisticated inves-
tors using unregulated vehicles such as hedge funds. See note 74 supra.
103. See Glenn, Some Swingers Found the Going Rough Last I ear, BMRo.'s, Feb.
3, 1969, at 27, col. 2; Performance Funds: Under a Cloud, FomuEs, Aug. 15, 1969, at 78,
80; Revolt Against the Funds, FORTUNE, Dec. 1971, at 165-66; FReND STUDY, supra note
59, at 144. See Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 26, col. 2; Telephone Interview with Peter
Vlacuse, Investment Manager of Dreyfus Leverage Fund, Jan. 29, 1973.
104. See Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 26, col. 2.
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change would certainly have opened a more efficient means of risk-
taking.
Although this evidence is fragmentary, it does suggest, as would be
expected from theoretical considerations, that the prevailing strict regu-
lation can damage mutual funds' performance. The results of the SEC
study that served as a foundation for the Company Act, which showed
a positive correlation between poor performance and leverage for the
period 1930-35, must have been either incorrect or peculiar to an
anomalous period in economic history.10
IV. Conclusion
The stricter controls on short selling and leveraging imposed on
mutual funds undermine the goals they were designed to further. They
do not act as an effective ceiling on risk-taking. Rather, they force
mutual funds to take unnecessary risks in order to secure high returns.
These controls may not be the only factor involved in the poor overall
performance of the funds; but they are almost certainly a contributing
cause. Thus, the controls needlessly frustrate the primary role that
Congress envisioned for the funds-to provide the small investor with
improved access to the high risks and returns of the securities markets.
The most appropriate reform would be simply to repeal the restrictions
now imposed by the Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code, 100
and thus to treat mutual funds on a par with all other investors. 107
105. See p. 1312 supra. There is evidence in the legislative history of the Company
Act's restrictions on leverage that the SEC depended on outmoded business cycle theory
in reaching its findings on the effects of leverage. To the extent that this was the case,
the SEC's conclusions were invalid. See E. LERNER, READINGS IN FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 69-118 (1963); NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARcII, TnE
BUSINESS CYCLE TODAY (V. Zarnowitz ed. 1972). There is also evidence in the legislative
history that the period analyzed (1930-1935) may have been unusual in that the overall
market decline was so sharp that interest rates actually exceeded the risk premium for
investing in common stocks. See 2 TRUST STUDY, supra note 42, at 922-23; 1940 Senate
Hearings, supra note 44, at 1028-29.
106. The specific motivation behind the tax penalty on short-term trading, including
short selling, is not entirely clear. It is apparent, however, that the basic motivation
was to implement the general purposes of the Company Act. See S. EP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., 12 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1940). It would
probably be best to eliminate the entire provision, since mere exemption of short sales from
the penalty would still leave mutual funds unable to engage in convertible arbitrage.
107. The alternative to repeal-strengthening the controls by adding restrictions on
the riskiness of individual securities that a fund can buy-would be contrary to the
equal opportunity goal of the Company Act, see pp. 1310-12 supra.
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